I n s p ir e d b y o u r o w n e x p e r ie n c e s a n d o b s e r v a tio n s -a n d w ith m u c h g r a ti t u d e for th e d e e p in sig h ts, g u id a n c e , a n d c h a lle n g e s of our rev iew te a m -w e w rote "The R ight P eople in the W rong P laces: The P ara d o x of E n tre p re n e u ria l Entry a n d S u ccessfu l O pportunity R ealization" (Navis & O zbek, 2016) , w ith th e aim of sp u rrin g d e b a te a n d n ew q u e stio n s a ro u n d th e co n tin g en t in flu en c es of o v erco n fid en ce a n d n a rc issism in e n tre p re n e u rsh ip . C e n tra l to our a rtic le is the core-a n d p e rh a p s pro v o cativ e-th e sis th a t e n tre p re n e u rs a re re g u la rly a ttra c te d to (repelled from) th e v ery ty p es of v en tu re contexts w h ere th ey a re le a s t (most) likely to b e su ccessfu l. In this spirit, w e found A h sa n 's (2017) e n g a g e m e n t w ith our a rtic le p re cisely th e kind of outcom e w e h a d h o p ed for. W e a re d e lig h te d to h a v e th e o p p o rtu nity to re sp o n d to h is dialogue! In h is d ia lo g u e A h san d e sc rib e s th re e m ain is s u e s w ith o u r a rtic le th a t h e a rg u e s lim it its p o ten tial. First, h e c o n sid e rs our definition of v en tu re context to b e too "narrow " a n d oversim pli fied. Second, h e finds our conceptualization of overconfidence "not clear." Third, h e b e lie v e s our conceptualization of n a rc issism is "am biguous." The resu lt of th ese pu rp o rted issu es, A h san claim s, is th a t our m odel h a s lim ited e x p lan a to ry pow er, c re a te s em pirical c h a lle n g e s in its testing, u n d e r specifies the en tre p ren e u rial process, a n d im p in g es on further th eo retical developm ent. G iven su ch serious critiques, o ne m ight qu estio n w hy our p a p e r w a s ever even pu b lish ed . O ur ex p lan atio n , in short, is th a t w e believ e A h san 's critiques a re m isguided. In the re m a in d e r of th is response, w e a d d re ss e a c h of th e se critiques in turn. O ur aim is not only to provide g re a te r clarity aro u n d the facets of our theory th a t m ay b e le ss evident but also -in the p ro cess-to provide a d d itio n al g u id a n c e for its continued developm ent a n d em pirical applicatio n .
VENTURE CONTEXT
W hen d efin in g v en tu re context in our article, w e d istin g u ish th e se ttin g s in w h ich v en tu re o p p o rtu n itie s a re p erceiv ed a n d p u rs u e d b a s e d on th e lev el of u n c e rta in ty th e ir fo u n d e rs m u st b ear. A h san c ritiq u e s th is definition a s b e in g narrow , co n c ep tu ally u n clea r, oversim plified, a n d u n a b le to ac co u n t for e n v iro n m e n ta l fluidity. As w e e x p la in below , w e b e lie v e th is critiq u e is off-base. O ur definition ex h ib its c o n sid e ra b le b re a d th , is co n c ep tu ally clear, an d , im portantly, su p p o rts a w ide a rra y of re s e a rc h se ttin g s-bo th sta b le a n d ev er c h a n g in g .
To begin, w e a re puzzled by A hsan's choice to lab el our definition of venture context a s "narrow." In w riting the m anuscript, w e conceptualized v en ture context in a w ay that w ould lend itself w ell to a variety of related -yet theoretically consistentem pirical specifications. Indeed, scholars can test our theory in relation to various types of ventures (e.g., "m ain street," high tech), industries (e.g., fast food, nanotechnology), and/or other classifications. W hat allow s for this generality and, in turn, m ak es th ese diverse em pirical tests com m ensurate with one another is a m easu re that is anchored on the level of uncertainty founders in a given setting m ust b ear-re g ard less of the n atu re of th at setting. Thus, rather th an focusing our conceptualization on p a r ticular industry stages, for instance, a s A hsan w ould h av e u s do-a n d w hich m ay not alw ay s exhibit by the sam e level of uncertainty-w e defined venture context according to the core, esse n tial logic of our theory: the level of environm ental uncertainty p re s ent. Doing so not only results in a definition th at is sufficiently b ro ad a n d g en eral but also reflects the type of theoretical precision a n d em pirical flexibility th at exem plifies high-quality, useful theory.
A h sa n a ls o e x p re s s e s co n cern s ab o u t th e c la r ity of o u r tre a tm e n t of u n certain ty , q u e stio n in g w h e th e r w e co n sid e r it in a n objective or p e rc e p tu a l (subjective) s e n s e in our definition. Here, w h ile A h san correctly e x p la in s th a t th is d istin c tio n h a s critica l th e o re tic a l im p o rtan ce (e.g., Boyd, D ess, & R ash ee d , 1993) , w e b e lie v e h e is m is g u id e d in a s s e rtin g th a t it is not ev id en t in our ow n work. In p a rtic u la r, to m ak e c le a r our in te re st in o b jective u n c e rta in ty in th e article, w e specify th a t th e u n c e rta in ty w ith w hich w e a re co n cern ed is "en d em ic" to v e n tu re co n tex ts a n d is, thus, so m e th in g th a t e n tre p re n e u rs m u st "bear." W e a re not only c le a r th a t our e m p h a s is is not on p erc e p tio n b u t w e a lso n ev e r portray, or b e g in to a llu d e to, th e no tio n of u n c e rta in ty in its p e rc e p tu a l form w h e n e lu c id a tin g our m odel. T hese p o in ts n o tw ith sta n d in g , how ever, w e ack n o w l e d g e th a t g re a te r clarity a ro u n d th is p oint m ay h a v e b e e n w a rra n te d in th e article. H ad w e jux ta p o s e d th e s e tw o form s of u n c e rta in ty in m ore ex p licit term s, it m ay h a v e p re c lu d e d se v e ra l of A h sa n 's o th er co n cern s, w hich, a s w e d esc rib e later, a p p e a r to re su lt from e v a lu a tin g the a rtic le th ro u g h th e le n s of p e rc e p tu a l u n certain ty .
The final point A hsan m ak es about our definition of venture context is to critique it a s oversim plified a n d u n ab le to account for environm ental fluidity. As w e d iag n o sed A hsan's ratio n ale for this a rg u m ent, w hat b ecam e clear to us w as a difference in our d esired aim for the article and, m ore generally, in our ap p ro ach tow ard theory developm ent. W hen describ in g our definition of venture context a s over sim plified, for instance, A hsan explains that not all new technologies are the sam e an d vary in term s of complexity a n d gestation period (e.g., apps, biotechnology, m edical devices). This m eans that in som e cases a venture context might be novel for a few months, w hereas in other situations a venture context might rem ain novel for more than a decade (2017: 145-146) .
A h sa n im p lies th a t th e s e d iv e rse co n d itio n s re flect co m p lex ities th a t n e e d to b e m ore explicitly m o d e le d for o ur th eo ry to b e useful. O n th is point w e co uld not d is a g re e m ore. W hile A h san cor rectly reco g n izes th e s e very re a l n u a n c e s th a t ca n o ccur in p ractice, w e do not b e lie v e our a rtic le w a s th e a p p ro p ria te p la c e to e lu c id a te them .
W e su b m it th a t th e o re tic a l m o d els like our own, w h ich a re fo cu sed on "big id ea" co n cep ts ra th e r th a n m ore in c re m e n ta l e x te n sio n s of ex istin g m o d els (Kilduff, 2006) , sh o u ld not atte m p t to "boil th e o cean " a n d specify th e v a rio u s a n d in tricate p a th w a y s of th eir a p p lic a tio n . Not only d o es su ch a d d e d com plexity le a d sc h o la rs to lo se th e forest for th e trees, in term s of th e m ost e sse n tia l, in tere stin g , a n d u sefu l e le m e n ts of th e theory, bu t it a lso im p o ses cognitive rig id itie s th a t m a y in d ic a te th a t s a id theory is m ore n arro w a n d s p e cific th a n it is in reality. A b e tte r ap p ro a c h , w e contend, is to b e ex c ep tio n ally c le a r a b o u t the core th e o re tic a l m e c h a n ism s a t p la y in th e m odel. In our c a s e th e s e m e c h a n ism s e x p la in th e core lin k a g e s a m o n g e n v ir o n m e n ta l u n c e r ta in ty , overconfidence, n a rc issism , a n d th eir effects at d ifferent levels. Thus, our m odel p ro v id es c le a r th eo re tic al g u id a n c e , bu t it le a v e s its a p p lic a tio n to a s s o c ia te d re se a rc h q u e stio n s a n d se ttin g s to th e d iscre tio n of sc h o la rs in te re ste d in te stin g a n d e x te n d in g its core ten ets. Illu stra tin g th is point in term s of A h sa n 's conjecture, th en , to th e ex ten t th a t th e g e sta tio n of a technology re d u c e s e n v i ro n m e n ta l u n certain ty , w e m ak e it c le a r in our theory th a t th is m a tu re d tech n o lo g y en v iro n m e n t sh o u ld no lo n g er b e c o n sid e re d novel from a n e m p irica l te stin g stan d p o in t. In short, w e ex p lic itly d e s ig n e d our theory to su p p o rt th e s e com plex e m p irica l re a litie s -a n d it d o es so w ith co n sid e ra b le flexibility a n d sim plicity.
S im ilar id e a s ap p ly to A h san 's critique th at w e "largely ignore th e influence of th e p rim ary factors th a t c reate oppo rtu n ities-nam ely, technological innovation a n d en v iro n m en tal c h a n g e s-on the perception, pursuit, a n d realizatio n of opp o rtu n i ties " (2017:146) . H ere a g a in , w e em p h asiz e th a t our m odel is ag n o stic ab o u t th e se a n te c e d e n t d e ta ils by design. O ur focus in ste a d is sim ply on th e level of u n certain ty p re se n t in the environm ents w h ere v en tu re opportunities a re b e in g p erceiv ed a n d p u rsu e d -re g a rd le ss of th e p o ssib le factors th at m ay h a v e led to su ch u ncertainty. The ra tio n a le for this a p p ro a c h re la te s b ack to our focus on objective u ncertainty, w h ere th e factors th at c re a te oppor tu n ities a re unlikely to h a v e a n y sy stem atic b e a r in g on the m ain re la tio n sh ip s in our m odel. Thus, given th eir irre le v an ce to the core m e c h a n ism s w e theorize, it w a s ap p ro p ria te for us to ex clude them from our m odel.
OVERCONFIDENCE
W e next tu rn to A h san 's concern w ith our con cep tu alizatio n of overconfidence, w hich h e reports January lack s clarity a n d p o ses em p irical ch a lle n g es. A h san s p e c u la te s th at "w hat m ight seem like o v e rc o n fid e n c e m ig h t a c tu a lly b e th e selfconfidence of th e en trep ren eu r, a n d this cognitive b e lie f (s e lf-c o n fid e n c e ) c o u ld v a ry from o n e v en tu re to th e next" (2017: 146), a n d th a t "w h eth er so m eth in g is self-confidence or overconfidence ca n n o t b e d e te rm in e d u n til th e outcom e of the ac tio n is know n" (2017: 146). W e re sp o n d to th e se p o in ts in th ree w ays. First, w e tak e th e o p p o rtu nity to clarify o u r focus on o v erconfidence a n d not self-co n fid en ce (or self-efficacy or optim ism ) in th e article. S econd, w e e x p la in th e im p o rtan ce of th is clarificatio n to our theory an d , rela ted ly , A h sa n 's co n cern th a t fo u n d ers' overconfidence m ay v ary from one v en tu re to th e next. Third, w e co m m en t on th e n a tu re of th e e m p irica l c h a lle n g e A h san d esc rib es.
To b eg in , w h a t s e p a ra te s overconfidence from self-co n fid en ce is the cognitive b ia s th a t ex e m p lifies th e form er construct. W e m ak e th is point ex p licit in th e article, e x p la in in g th a t b e c a u s e overco n fid en ce im p lies a cogn itiv e b ia s th a t in flu e n ces d ec isio n m a k in g (Trevelyan, 2008) , it differs from re la te d co n c ep ts like self-efficacy a n d optim ism , w h ich refer, resp ectiv ely , to in d iv id u a ls' co n fid en ce in th e ir a b ility to perform a ro le or ta s k (Boyd & V ozikis, 1994 ; C a s s a r & F rie d m a n , 2009; C h e n , G re e n e , & C rick, 1998) a n d th eir ex p e ctatio n of p ositive outcom es, ev en w h e n n o r a tio n a l b a s is for th o s e e x p e c ta tio n s e M oreover, to e n su re th is p oint is not lost, w e m ake re fere n ce to th is cognitive b ia s th ro u g h o u t the article. As w ith o th er re se a rc h , the re a so n co n stru ct clarity is so critica l in our c a s e is th a t it m a tte rs fu n d a m e n ta lly for th e th e o re tic a l m ech a n is m s w e th eo rize-n am ely , th o se p e rta in in g to th e effects of o v erco n fid en ce in th e p re se n c e of u n certain ty . W h e re a s h ig h e r lev els of objective u n c e r ta in ty c le a rly e x a c e r b a te th e e ffe c ts of o v e rc o n fid e n c e (e.g., H a y w a rd , S h e p h e rd , & G riffin , 2006; M a lm e n d ie r & T a te , 2008), it is not c le a r th at th e s a m e outcom e is tru e of h ig h er levels of perceived u ncertainty. This a g a in is w hy w e d ire c t a tte n tio n to w a rd o b je c tiv e -r a th e r th a n p e rc e iv e d -u n c e rta in ty in th e article.
The a b o v e logic a ls o s h e d s lig h t on w hy A h s a n 's n o tio n of se lf-co n fid en c e d o e s not fit a s c le a n ly in our m odel. F irst, it is not c le a r w h e th e r a h ig h e r le v e l of o b jectiv e u n c e rta in ty e x a c e r b a te s th e effects of se lf-co n fid en c e th e s a m e w a y it d o e s for o v erco n fid en c e. S econd, w h e re a s se lf-co n fid en c e (a n d p e rc e iv e d u n ce rtain ty ) m ay v ary c o n s id e ra b ly from v e n tu re to v e n tu re a s a fun ctio n of fo u n d e rs' e x p e rie n c e a n d fa m ilia rity w ith a re s p e c tiv e v e n tu re c o n tex t-a s A h sa n a llu d e s to in h is d is c u s s io n of e x p e rt e n tre p re n e u rs , for in s ta n c e -o v erco n fid en c e is le s s su b ject to th e s e e x p e r ie n tia l a n d c o n te x tu a l id io s y n c ra s ie s . Even if it w ere, how ever, w e note th a t our m odel w ould still su p p o rt th is v a ri ability. All th a t m a tte rs for our th eo ry is th e lev el of overconfidence a n d e n v ir o n m e n ta l u n c e r ta in ty p r e s e n t -for a giv en re s e a rc h sa m p le -in s h a p in g fo u n d ers' p e r c e p tio n s a n d p u r s u its of e n tr e p r e n e u r ia l o p p o rtu n itie s . T hus, w h a t A h s a n r a is e d in o u r a p p ro a c h a s a flaw , a s w e now e x p lain , m ay b e tte r b e u n d e rsto o d a s a n im p o rtan t m e a su re m e n t c o n sid e ra tio n to ac co u n t for w h en te stin g our theory.
B uilding on the ab o v e point, a n d n o tw ith sta n d ing our c a se for construct clarity, w e ack n o w led g e th at A h san ra is e s a v alid point ab o u t th e c h a l len g e s of m e a su rin g overconfidence an d , for th at m atter, d istin g u ish in g it from self-confidence. W e a re careful to m ak e th e form er point in the article, ex p lain in g th a t "other sch o lars h a v e re siste d u s in g the term 'overconfidence,' sin ce its d ia g n o sis re q u ires know ledge of th e true p ro b a b ilities a s s o ciate d w ith a lte rn a tiv e decisio n outcom es, w hich m ay b e im p o ssib le to know in o rg a n iz atio n al s e t tin g s (e.g., C h atterjee & H am brick, 2011)" (Navis & Ozbek, 2016: 110) . N onetheless, our choice to focus on overconfidence w a s d e lib e ra te a n d driven by our in tere st in m a in ta in in g precisio n in our th eo retical arg u m e n ts. W e note th at w hile m e a su re s u se d to test theory a re rarely perfect, m ean in g fu l proxies ca n a n d often do exist. Indeed, the sam e is true of overconfidence, w h ere sch o lars h a v e a s s e s s e d th is b ia s u sin g such proxies a s th e d u ratio n of CEO options (M alm endier & Tate, 2005; M alm endier, Tate, & Yan, 2011) , firm -level in v estm en t b eh a v io rs (Schrand & Zechm an, 2012) , a n d survey a s s e ss m e n ts of ex trem e confidence (Simon & H oughton, 2003; Sim on & S hrader, 2012) . W hat is critical for us, how ever, is not to bu ild theory aro u n d p a rtic u la r m e a su re s but, rath er, to en su re th at th e constructs a n d m e c h a n ism s sp e c ified in our theory a re a s p u re a n d p re cise a s p o s sible. D oing so, w e hope, w ill in d e e d op en sev e ral w ay s for the article to b e em pirically tested. F in ally , A h sa n offers so m e in trig u in g factors th a t m ight condition our theorized effects of overconfidence. He notes, for instance, th a t th e e n tre p re n e u ria l p ro c e ss in to d a y 's w orld is v ery d ifferent from th e e a rly d a y s of dotcom s. A sig n ific a n t n u m b e r of novel v e n tu re s a r e p u rsu ed , ev olved, a n d re a liz e d w ith in in c u b a to rs a n d a c c e le ra to rs, a n d m a n y novel o p p o rtu n ities a re p e r ce iv e d in la b s, e s p e c ia lly in a r e a s su c h a s h e a lth sc ien c es, artific ia l in te llig en c e, n an o tech n o lo g y , a n d so forth (2017: 146).
W e a g re e w ith th e s e notew orthy d ifferen ces in e n tre p re n e u ria l p ro cess, a n d w e th a n k A h san for ra is in g th em a s p a th s to fu rth er d ev e lo p a n d e x te n d our m odel. At the s a m e tim e, how ever, w e w o u ld c a u tio n re a d e rs a g a in s t a d o p tin g a n overly ra tio n a lis tic p ersp e c tiv e in do in g so. W ith n a r cissism , for in stan ce , w hich w e tu rn to next, the s a m e c h a ris m a th a t e n a b le s n a rc issistic fou n d ers to se ll th e ir v isio n to o th ers (e.g., E isen m an n , 2013) c a n s u p p re s s th e q u a lity of inform ation a n d a c tio n s th ey elicit from "p eers, m entors, custom ers, a n d in v esto rs" (A hsan, 2017: 146) . For th e s e r e a so n s, a n d m irro rin g our ow n ex p e rie n c e a n d o b s e rv a tio n s w ith a w id e a rra y of v en tu re start-u p s, in v esto rs, a n d a c c e le ra to rs, A h sa n 's notion th at "e n tre p re n e u rs w ho fail to do th is w ill likely b e w e e d e d out by in v esto rs d u rin g th e opportunity re a liz a tio n p h a s e a n d re p la c e d by m ore su ita b le in d iv id u a ls" (2017:146) m ay b e m ore th e exception th a n th e rule. H ow ever, ra th e r th a n sp e c u la te further, w e c o n sid er th e se a n d re la te d q u e stio n s of how e n tre p re n e u ria l p ro c ess m ight in flu en ce o u r th eo rized re la tio n sh ip s to b e ripe for em p irica l in v estig atio n ! NARCISSISM A h san 's final critiq u es p e rta in to our conceptu alizatio n of n arcissism , w hich h e sa y s suffers from "concept red u n d an cy " w ith overconfidence. He a ls o in tro d u c e s w h a t w e w o u ld c o n s id e r a prom ising ap p licatio n a n d p otential refinem ent of our core m odel, effectively illu stratin g the m odel's utility. W e co n sider e a c h of th ese points in turn.
O n th e su b ject of overconfidence a n d n arcissism b e in g conflated, w e m a in ta in th a t the two con stru cts a re co n cep tu ally distinct. Indeed, one can b e overconfident w ithout ex h ib itin g h ig h levels of n arcissism . Sim ilarly, one c a n exhibit hig h levels of n a rc issism w ithout b e in g overconfident. W hat d istin g u ish e s th e two-a n d ca lls for th eir s e p a ra te trea tm e n t in th e article a n d elsew h ere-a re the cognitive m ech a n ism s of the form er a n d the b e h av io ra l m ech a n ism s of the latter. F ocusing on only one e x c lu d e s th e u n iq u e a n d com plem entary in flu e n c e s of th e oth er. A lte rn a tiv e ly , fo c u sin g on a m ore h y b rid ized co nstruct like hubris, w hich c a n m an ife st w ith in d iv id u a ls e x h ib itin g both o v erconfidence a n d n a rc issism , c re a te s em p irica l ch a lle n g e s, sin ce both of th e se d im en sio n s a re not re q u ire d a t th e sa m e lev el-or ev en a t a ll-for its d ia g n o sis (O w en & D avidson, 2009 ). H ence, w e focused on th e se tw o s e p a ra te a n d m ore e s ta b lish e d co n stru cts to m ore clea rly theorize th e in d e p e n d e n t a n d co m b in ed effects of e a c h one. This d ec isio n a lso h a s im p o rtan t em p iric a l im p lic a tions, a s w e d e sc rib e next.
Even th o u g h o v erconfidence a n d n a rc issism a re c o n c ep tu ally distinct, a s w e m a in ta in , A h san ra is e s th e im p o rtan t q u e stio n of w h e th e r th e two c a n b e d istin g u ish e d em pirically. W e a d m ire h is a tte n tio n to th e s e im p o rtan t m e a su re m e n t co n sid e ra tio n s. Here, how ever, w e su b m it th a t clo ser a tte n tio n to th e m e a su re s u se d to a s s e s s n a rc is sism h e lp s to re v e a l th is co n cern a s le ss troubling.
In th e c a s e of u n o b tru siv e m e a su re s of n a rc issism (e.g., C h a tte rje e & H am brick, 2007), for in sta n c e , the b e h a v io ra l in d icato rs u s e d in p rior re se a rc h , su ch a s th e ex c e ssiv e u se of self-ab so rb in g la n g u a g e or c o m p e n sa tio n d isc re p a n c ie s b e tw e e n le a d e rs a n d others, ex h ib it c le a r d istin c tio n s from th e cognitive b ia s e s of overconfidence. The sa m e d istin c tio n s a re p re se n t a m o n g m ore d irect m e a su re s of n a rc issism , w h e re th e m ain factors th a t m ak e u p th e N a rcissistic P erso n a lity Inventory (e.g., s e n s e of authority, ex h ib itio n ism , su p e rio r ity, vanity, e x p lo ita tiv e n e ss, e n titlem en t, a n d selfsufficiency), for in stan ce , a lso ta p into n a rc issistic q u a litie s th a t a re very m uch d istin c t from the cognitive b ia s of overconfidence (R askin & Terry, 1988) . H ere w e sh o u ld m ention th a t w h ile it is c e rta in ly p o ssib le th a t th e p re se n c e of th e s e two co n stru cts will, on a v e ra g e , b e h ig h ly co rre la te d in p ra c tic e -a s A h san s u g g e s ts in h is note-w e a re ca refu l to not p re su p p o se th is p o ssib ility in our m odel. M oreover, a n d e q u a lly im portant, in c a s e s w h e re th e se c o rrelatio n s a re not a s high, e x istin g m e a su re s a p p e a r w ell su ite d to d istin g u ish th e in d e p e n d e n t a n d v a ria n t effects of them both, a s w e h a v e d esc rib ed .
F in a lly , A h s a n c o n c lu d e s h is re p ly b y c h a lle n g in g -a s "overly sim plistic"-our p ro p o sa l th a t n a rc issistic in d iv id u a ls w ill b e d riv en to p u rsu e novel opportunities. Instead, h e argues, e n tre p re n e u rs a re m ore likely to e n te r d o m ain s a t the takeoff stag e of an industry's lifecycle (Christensen, 1992) , since this stag e is often typi fied by the type of m edia attention an d clear and unam biguous feedback that narcissistic founders crave. In ad vancing these ideas, A hsan u ses the core logic from our theory to develop a more sp e cific set of testab le hypotheses. This is exactly the outcom e we h ad hoped for from this article. And yet it also b ears m entioning that h a d we narrow ed our theory in this w ay ourselves, we would have inappropriately lim ited the scope of its a p p lic a tion aw ay from other potential dom ains c h arac terized by high levels of uncertainty. In the end, we forewent the focus on a specific application, a s A hsan advocates here, in the interest of d e veloping theory with broader generality and sim plicity-a classic trade-off that all scholars m ust m ake (Weick, 1979) .
CONCLUSION
We w ish to close by resurfacing the central twist, or paradox, of our article, which easily gets lost in the details of A hsan's dialogue an d our own response: the expectation that "entrepreneurs high in overconfidence an d narcissism are pro pelled tow ard more novel venture contextsw here these qualities a re most detrim ental to venture success-a n d a re repelled from more fam iliar venture contexts-w here these qualities are least harm ful an d m ay even facilitate ven ture success" (Navis & Ozbek, 2016: 109) . In other w ords, we call back to the m ore fu n d am en tal id ea th at the "right people" often end up in the "wrong p laces" w hen it com es to e n trep ren eu rial entry a n d successful opportunity realization. We hope this resp o n se provides the clarification, guidance, a n d fodder to inspire others-like A hsan-to ad v a n ce rese a rc h around this id ea as well!
